PRESIDENT Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma is one of South Africa’s most polarising political figures. A former anti-apartheid struggle veteran, intelligence operative, and ANC leader, Zuma’s career has been marked by both remarkable political survival and deep controversy.
After his tumultuous presidency (2009–2018), which ended in resignation amid corruption allegations and internal ANC strife, many believed his political career was over. Yet, in a stunning turnaround, Zuma has re-emerged as a central figure through the uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) Party, which in its first election (2024) became the third-largest party in Parliament, the largest in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), and secured representation in several provincial legislatures.
Given his legal bar from Parliament and ineligibility for a third presidential term, Zuma’s role is now that of a kingmaker rather than a direct executive leader. But what does his resurgence mean for South Africa? Can the MK Party offer anything substantively different from Zuma’s previous leadership, or is it merely a vehicle for personal grievance and political disruption? This analysis critically examines Zuma’s leadership. Its strengths, failures, and contradictions and assesses what the MK Party represents in South Africa’s evolving political landscape.
The Pros of Zuma’s leadership and political appeal
Zuma’s greatest strength lies in his political shrewdness. His ability to navigate crises, out-manoeuvre opponents, and maintain a loyal support base is unmatched in South African politics. Despite facing numerous legal battles, corruption charges, and internal ANC factionalism, he has repeatedly staged comebacks.
His MK Party’s rapid rise despite lacking infrastructure and funding demonstrates his enduring influence, particularly in KZN and among disaffected ANC voters.
Unlike the more aloof Thabo Mbeki or the technocratic Cyril Ramaphosa, Zuma connects with ordinary South Africans through his warmth, humour, and apparent humility. His background as a self-educated herdboy who rose to prominence resonates with many working-class and rural voters who see him as “one of them.” This charisma has allowed him to retain a cult-like following, even among those aware of his alleged corruption.
Zuma positioned himself as a pro-poor leader advocating for “radical economic transformation” (RET), a populist agenda purporting to target white monopoly capital and calling for land expropriation without compensation, increased black ownership, and state intervention in the economy. While his implementation was inconsistent, this rhetoric endeared him to leftists and economic nationalists disillusioned with the ANC’s neoliberal tendencies under Mbeki and Ramaphosa.
Zuma’s supporters argue that he was unfairly targeted by political and business elites for challenging the status quo. This narrative of a leader persecuted for standing up to entrenched power has galvanised his base, particularly among those who feel excluded from post-apartheid prosperity.
Under Zuma, South Africa deepened ties with BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), positioning itself as a leader in the Global South. His government also pursued a more assertive pan-African foreign policy, including mediating in conflicts like Libya and advocating for African solutions to continental problems.
The cons of Zuma’s leadership and governance failures
Zuma’s presidency is synonymous with grand corruption, most notably the Gupta scandal, where private business interests allegedly dictated cabinet appointments, state contracts, and policy decisions.
The Zondo Commission’s findings painted a damning picture of systemic looting under his watch, crippling key institutions like Eskom, SAA, and SARS. While Zuma denies wrongdoing, the evidence of state capture has severely tarnished his legacy.
Despite his pro-poor rhetoric, Zuma’s tenure saw economic decline, with GDP growth averaging just 1.8% between 2009 and 2018 (compared to 4.5% under Mbeki). Unemployment soared, and credit rating downgrades followed due to policy uncertainty and corruption allegations.
Zuma’s refusal to comply with court orders culminating in his 2021 imprisonment for contempt set a dangerous precedent. His defiance may have emboldened others to disregard judicial authority, weakening constitutionalism.
Liberated from the ANC’s institutional chains
During his tumultuous presidency, Zuma often found himself hamstrung by the very party that brought him to power. The ANC, for all its flaws, remained a broad church. A coalition of competing interests, ideologies, and power brokers. Zuma’s Radical Economic Transformation (RET) agenda, with its promises of sweeping land reform and economic redistribution, was frequently watered down by ANC traditionalists, reformists, Treasury technocrats, and the party’s alliance partners.
Now, freed from these constraints, Zuma’s MK Party operates as a pure extension of his political will. There are no internal factions to appease, no alliance partners to placate, and no need to temper his rhetoric for the sake of party unity. The result? A far more aggressive, populist movement, one that can promise radical change without the burden of delivering it, at least not yet.
This unfiltered approach has already proven effective. The MK Party’s messaging, a blend of economic militancy, anti-establishment grievance, and nostalgic appeals to the liberation struggle has resonated powerfully mostly in KZN and among disillusioned ANC voters.
Unlike the ANC, which must balance competing interests, the MK Party answers only to Zuma. That makes it far more nimble, far more dangerous, and, for his supporters, far more appealing.
One of the most striking differences between Zuma’s leadership in the ANC and his new role in the MK Party is his ability to openly embrace identity politics. The ANC, as a national liberation movement, has long suppressed overt ethnic mobilisation in favour of a unifying, non-racial vision. But Zuma’s MK Party faces no such restrictions.
In KZN, where the party now dominates, Zuma has skilfully challenged the IFP and positioned himself as the champion of Zulu pride and historical grievance. The MK Party’s rhetoric often frames the ANC as a party of “Johannesburg or Ramaphosa elites” who have betrayed the rural poor. A narrative that carries strong ethnic undertones. This is a calculated strategy. By indirectly tapping into Zulu nationalism and memories of past marginalisation without being overtly ethnic, Zuma has built a loyal base that sees him not just as a political leader but as a cultural symbol.
This shift has profound implications. While the ANC struggles to maintain its broad coalition, the MK Party can consolidate its support by appealing directly to a specific demographic. The risk, of course, is that this approach deepens ethnic divisions in a country still haunted by the spectre of tribalism. But for Zuma, the rewards of undivided loyalty, a clear enemy to rally against, and a simplified political narrative may well outweigh those risks.
Power without responsibility
Perhaps the greatest advantage Zuma now enjoys is the ability to wield influence without the burdens of executive power. As president, he was held accountable for every blackout, every corruption scandal, and every economic downturn.
Today, the MK Party is an opposition force that can attack the ANC and the DA-led coalition government without offering concrete solutions of its own.
This is a potent position. Zuma can rail against the failures of the state while avoiding any responsibility for fixing them. He can promise radical change on land expropriation, nationalisation, and sweeping reforms without the messy reality of implementation. And, crucially, he can position himself as the voice of the marginalised, the anti-establishment outsider, even as he remains one of the most entrenched political figures in the country.
But the real power of the MK Party lies in its potential as a kingmaker. With enough seats to sway national and provincial coalitions, Zuma can extract concessions, legal protections for himself and his allies, policy shifts, and even the destabilisation of the ANC itself. He no longer needs to win outright; he just needs to make himself indispensable.
The MK Party: Fresh start or old wineskins?
Zuma’s MK Party bursts onto South Africa’s political stage with all the subtlety of a thunderclap, leaving observers scrambling to answer one crucial question: does this movement represent something genuinely new, or is it simply Zuma’s revenge fantasy dressed up as a political party?
The case for renewal appears compelling at first glance. By shattering the ANC’s electoral monopoly in KwaZulu-Natal and beyond, the MK Party has achieved what opposition groups have failed to do for decades. To make South Africa’s democracy properly competitive. This seismic shift could finally force the ruling party to clean up its act or face permanent decline.
Moreover, the MK Party’s unapologetic embrace of radical economic transformation positions it to push policies that the ANC has only ever paid lip service to, namely meaningful land reform, serious wealth redistribution, and a break from neoliberal orthodoxy.
Yet for all its revolutionary posturing, the MK Party carries the unmistakable whiff of recycled politics. Its leadership roster reads like a who’s who of Zuma’s ANC faction, with many figures bearing the stains of corruption allegations. The party’s visceral hostility toward Ramaphosa’s ANC often feels more like a personal grudge match than a principled ideological stand. And its covert Zulu nationalist undertones threaten to take South African politics down a dangerous ethnic path we haven’t seen since the bloody 1990s.
Most worryingly, the MK Party remains fundamentally a vehicle for Zuma’s personal ambitions rather than a coherent political project. Like a political version of the movie “Weekend at Bernie’s”, one wonders what happens when the animating force (in this case, Zuma’s personal magnetism and grudges) eventually departs the scene. Will there be anything of substance left?
The tragedy is that South Africa desperately needs fresh political alternatives. But whether the MK Party can be that alternative rather than just the ghost of ANC failures past remains very much an open question. What’s certain is that Zuma, ever the political Houdini, has once again found a way to keep himself at the centre of our national conversation, for better or worse.
A contradictory legacy and uncertain future
Zuma is a paradox, a leader with undeniable political genius yet catastrophic governance failures. His MK Party represents both a backlash against the ANC’s failures and a continuation of his personal political warfare.
Can he offer something new? Only if the MK Party evolves beyond Zuma’s personal grievances into a structured movement with clear policies. Otherwise, it risks becoming another factional project, further fragmenting South Africa’s already volatile politics.
Zuma’s legacy is a cautionary tale: charisma and populism can win elections, but without accountability, they lead to decay. South Africa must decide whether his resurgence is a corrective to a failing ANC or a return to a darker chapter best left behind.
The ultimate question is whether the MK Party represents a genuine political alternative or merely a vehicle for Zuma’s personal vendettas. Unlike the ANC, which must balance governance with political survival, the MK Party has no such dual mandate. It exists to serve Zuma’s interests. Whether that means securing his legacy, shielding him from legal consequences, or simply ensuring his continued relevance.
There is a scenario in which the MK Party evolves into a lasting force, institutionalising Zuma’s brand of populism and providing a home for disaffected ANC voters. But there is also a darker possibility, that the party becomes a destabilising influence, deepening divisions, undermining institutions, and prolonging South Africa’s political dysfunction.
For now, Zuma is back, and he is playing by his own rules. The ANC could not contain him. The courts could not silence him. And the political establishment, it seems, still does not know how to stop him. Whether this second act ends in redemption or ruin will depend not just on Zuma but on whether South Africa’s democracy is strong enough to survive him.
(Dube is a political economist, businessman, and social commentator on Ukhozi FM. His views don't necessarily reflect those of the Sunday Tribune or Indepedent Media or IOL. Read more of his articles here: www. ncodube.blog)
SUNDAY TRIBUNE