Prof Anthoni van Nieuwkerk
THE state of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is under intense scrutiny. The debacle in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) captures the crisis.
Engulfed since 1994 in multiple crises including corruption, political interference, budget challenges and poor operational performance, what should be done to transform the Force for it to effectively execute its Constitutional mandate?
First, it is useful to clarify the purpose of the SANDF. Its primary mission is to defend South Africa against external aggression. In doing so, it is guided by the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.
It has secondary domestic responsibilities, primarily to assist the authorities in maintaining or restoring law and order. The purpose of the Department of Defence is to oversee the SANDF and to enable, prepare, employ, sustain and renew defence capabilities.
How well does it perform?
The South African government has been actively involved in peacemaking on the continent since its first democratic election. It has spent time mediating in several African conflict settings including Burundi, Comoros, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe.
For a period, South Africa was viewed as a leader in this field and its presidents and diplomats became sought-after mediators. South Africa’s defence diplomacy (the use of military personnel in support of conflict prevention and resolution) was seen as a pivotal element of its Africa strategy.
And until recently, South Africa was an active troop-contributing country to United Nations peace missions (namely the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) of which the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) formed part, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the SADC Mission to Mozambique (SAMIM), and most recently, the SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC).
The SANDF also conducted joint multinational military exercises and military assistance operations, for example, Operation COPPER, an anti-piracy operation in the Mozambique Channel deployed in support of SADC maritime security. Finally, it has a significant international network of defence attaches with ten offices in the member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
However, this active role as a peace builder is not sustainable. Year after year, our political class fails to commit the resources needed to maintain a capable defence force with continental reach. Currently, defence spending is about 0.7% of GDP, versus the international norm of 2% of GDP. Budget allocations reveal other problems too. Much of the defence budget (64.8%) goes towards the compensation of employees.
In addition, decision-makers fail to incorporate capability-based planning into strategic defence planning – the result of an inadequate strategic management model and a dysfunctional organisational culture. To underscore this point, in recent parliamentary debates, it emerged that the Navy currently has limited seaworthy vessels and the Air Force has few flying aircraft, meaning deployment to missions in conflict zones across Africa is now a high-risk exercise.
Over time, South Africa’s role as African peace builder became hobbled by ageing defence equipment, a shortage of serviceable equipment, a lack of strategic lift, a shortage of qualified personnel, and disqualification from deployment due to breaches of the code of conduct. Multinational military exercises have also been affected by cost-cutting measures. These are some of the reasons that contributed to the failure of the SAMIDRC mission, to which South Africa contributed most personnel and equipment.
The purpose was not peacekeeping but to ‘fight armed groups’, as SADC phrased it. It meant actively neutralising the M23 rebel group. In failing to do so, 14 South African soldiers died, and the rest of the contingent became hostage to the victorious M23 rebels. There are other reasons too.
What was the SADC and South African decision-makers understanding of the geopolitical terrain? Were they well served by intelligence sources, or did they ignore reports? How effective was integrated decision-making – aligning political, diplomatic and military goals?
After the conclusion of the SADC mission in Mozambique, where the purpose was to neutralise the threat of violent extremism and terrorism, an internal assessment was made, followed by a more open process involving experts in evaluating the mission. Important lessons were identified which were meant to inform subsequent missions of a peace enforcement nature – particularly the deployment to the DRC. It remains unclear whether the SADC and South African leadership received and acted on these messages.
What can be done to reverse the SANDF’s weaknesses and its damaged credibility on the continent and at home?
First, the harsh reality is that SANDF's participation in peacebuilding on the continent, which is a key part of its mandate, must be suspended until current problems are fully addressed.
Second, the government must agree to a comprehensive review of the country’s defence sector. The so-called Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a tool that has been applied, ironically, by the South Africans in peace-making interventions in the DRC and elsewhere.
SSR is the political and technical process of improving state and human security by making security provision, management and oversight more effective and more accountable, within a framework of democratic civilian control, rule of law and respect for human rights. It is now time to turn these analytical lenses to the home front.
This has been done before, with the amalgamation of the liberation movements’ armed forces with the apartheid-era defence force. It was a difficult and incomplete process. Another attempt was made in 2015 to update defence policy, but with no real success.
Learning from these efforts, the challenge of designing policy frameworks and resourcing an appropriately designed SANDF (a force that is fit for purpose) and meeting its operational requirements (training, equipment, deployment mandates) needs to be addressed by multidisciplinary teams of experts and by drawing on the experiences of the past.
The tragedy in the DRC demonstrates that the nation cannot rely on the current crop of defence officials and generals to undertake such a task. They need assistance. And more money is not necessarily the solution – rather it is money well spent on the right priorities.
Third, if the government of national unity is unable to overcome its identity crisis and fails to make decisions in the national interest, the task of conducting an SSR process should be handed over to a working group of experts as part of the upcoming national dialogue. Broad-based consensus on the remake of the military and restoring trust in the institution is of national and continental importance.
* Prof Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, Thabo Mbeki African School of Public and International Affairs.
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.